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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
T
he Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which offers 
relief from federal income-tax payments for a target-
ed group of taxpayers, is based on national income 
limits and the presence of dependent children. Ben-
efits determinations are made with a flat national maximum 
level of assistance. The EITC is extended to nearly 29 mil-
lion families and costs the U.S. Treasury about $64 billion 
annually. 
While the EITC uses national parameters to determine eligi-
bility and benefits, the U.S. labor force is dispersed among a 
series of disparate labor markets in metropolitan areas. Each 
market within each geography has unique characteristics, 
with vastly different wage distributions and costs of liv-
ing. The unique characteristics of local labor markets make 
the unyielding nature of a national EITC far less effective 
to induce labor-force changes in high-cost areas, and much 
more effective in low-cost areas.
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In this paper, we demonstrate that, while 20 percent of U.S. 
residents claim the EITC, the rate of claims differs vastly by 
metro area. EITC claim rates range from 5.5 percent in Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, to more than 50 percent in Rio Grande 
City, Texas. A primary contributor to these differentials is 
the difference in the credit’s real value across areas with dif-
ferent costs of living. The real value of the maximum EITC 
for a single taxpayer with one child ranges from $4,131 in 
Harlingen, Texas, to $1,531 in New York City.
The EITC’s national income limits for eligibility and its 
phase-out range induce varying labor-market incentives 
across markets with different wage distributions. The 
national parameters treat similar workers differently when 
they live in different areas. Consider a typical single parent 
working as a dishwasher in San Francisco; she will be subject 
to the phase-out of benefits after working 1,688 hours, while 
that same dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas won’t face this 
tax until working 2,190 hours. 
Adjusting the value of the EITC for local labor-market 
and cost-of-living conditions would provide a way to tar-
get credit expansion to the most needy and induce a larger 
labor-market response. Changing the EITC to adjust for real 
purchasing-power differences could be set to maximize the 
policy’s employment impact across labor markets by reduc-
ing implicit marginal tax rates. Our simulations show that, 
to induce a 6-percentage-point increase in the labor-force-
participation rate of eligible taxpayers, the maximum EITC 
for single parents in New York City would need to be $9,905, 
while a credit of $5,897 would induce the same response in 
Memphis, Tennessee.
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception 40 years ago, the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) has provided tax relief to America’s working 
poor. While the policy’s details have changed over the years 
– in terms of how it works, who receives benefits and how 
large those benefits are – the EITC is viewed widely as an 
effective approach to fight poverty and expand employment 
opportunities.
This paper, which examines the federal EITC’s current itera-
tion, has four central findings:
1. At the national level, 20 percent of taxpayers ben-
efit from the EITC, with an average tax reduction of 
$2,371. There are wide disparities in benefits across 
metropolitan areas, with claim rates ranging from 5.5 
percent in Los Alamos, New Mexico, to more than 50 
percent in Rio Grande City, Texas. Claim-rate differ-
entials are strongly related to city-level poverty, fam-
ily size, employment and local cost of living.
2. Cost-of-living differences across U.S. metropolitan 
areas create vast differences in the real value of the 
EITC. For a single taxpayer with one child, that value 
ranges from $4,131 in Harlingen, Texas, to $1,531 in 
New York City.
3. The EITC’s national income limits generate differing 
labor-market incentives for similar workers in dif-
ferent metropolitan areas. The typical single parent 
working as a dishwasher in San Francisco will be sub-
ject to credit reductions after working 1,688 hours, 
while that same dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas, 
won’t face this tax until he or she has worked 2,190 
hours. 
4. Model simulations show that, to induce a 6-percent-
age-point increase in the labor-force participation 
rate among eligible taxpayers, the EITC would need 
to be vastly different across metro areas. For single 
parents in New York City, it would take a credit of 
$9,905 to induce the same response as a $5,897 credit 
would in Memphis, Tennessee.
Policymakers on both sides of the political aisle have been 
outspoken supporters of EITC expansion, but there remains 
disagreement on the type of expansion that would be most 
effective in boosting employment and reducing poverty. The 
two most common approaches to transforming the EITC are 
to expand the size of the maximum-available credit (espe-
cially for childless workers) or change the rate of the credit 
to make work more rewarding (especially in the “phase-out” 
region). Each of these policies has merit, but each fails to 
account for how the EITC interacts with the local nature of 
labor markets.
Among the vast differences in U.S. labor markets, none are 
more striking than the relative value of an earned dollar. A 
dollar earned in Cleveland would have only about 45 cents 
of purchasing power in Manhattan; a $30,000 salary in San 
Francisco is equivalent to earning barely more than $16,000 
in Omaha, Nebraska. 
Despite these vast differences in real purchasing power 
across labor markets, the federal EITC has strict national 
parameters that do not adjust for local labor-market con-
ditions. For example, the current maximum credit for tax-
payers with one dependent child is set by statute at $3,359. 
Across U.S. metropolitan areas, the real purchasing power 
of that credit ranges from slightly more than $1,500 to more 
than $4,100. These differences result in the policy having 
uneven impacts across labor markets. The EITC has little 
impact to induce employment in high-cost areas but a large 
positive impact in low-cost metros.
Making cost-of-living adjustments to the EITC could  provide 
a more targeted way to expand the credit to those in greater 
FIGURE 1: USPS BOARD MEMBERS, 2010-2016
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need with the worst labor-market attachments. The credit 
could be adjusted to increase fairness, maximize the policy’s 
employment impact across labor markets and reduce prob-
lems of welfare migration and increasing marginal tax rates.
POLICY BACKGROUND
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which offers relief 
from federal income-tax payments for a targeted group of 
taxpayers, is based on national income limits and the pres-
ence of dependent children. It is a refundable credit – that is, 
if the size of the credit creates negative tax liability, a recipi-
ent is eligible to receive that payment. There are four basic 
components to the credit:
1. A “phase-in” range, in which every dollar of addition-
al earned income is supplemented by a percentage-
based tax benefit; 
2. A nationally set maximum credit that can be award-
ed;
3. An income level at which the credit begins to be 
removed (“phased-out”), with a corresponding 
phase-out rate; and
4. An income level at which the credit is completely 
exhausted.
The generosity of the credit and income parameters vary 
with the worker’s tax status and number of dependent chil-
dren, according to the schedule in Table 1:
The EITC is designed to create an incentive for tax filers 
to enter and maintain attachment to the labor force, while 
providing a cash transfer to boost incomes. The policy began 
in 1975 as an offset to Social Security taxes for low-income 
workers. It has grown since then into one of the primary 
ways the federal government works to combat poverty.1 Over 
the past 40 years, the federal EITC has undergone several 
expansions to increase the size of credit, change eligibility, 
expand income limits, reduce fraud and improve incentives. 
Currently, the EITC is extended to nearly 29 million families 
and costs the U.S. Treasury about $64 billion2 annually. 
DISTRIBUTION OF EITC BENEFITS ACROSS U.S. 
CITIES
Nationally, about 20 percent of tax filers receive some benefit 
from the ETIC, with an average tax reduction of $2,371. Both 
the share of tax filers and the average benefit differ widely 
across the country. The metro area with the highest percent-
age of taxpayers who benefit from the EITC is Rio Grande 
City, Texas, with more than 51 percent receiving at least 
some tax reduction. Demonstrating the degree of variation 
across metros, Los Alamos, New Mexico has the lowest per-
centage of taxpayers who benefit from the EITC, at just 5.5. 
 
The average tax reduction from the EITC also varies, but 
not by nearly as much as the claim rate. The largest average 
tax reduction from the EITC is found in Zapata, Texas, at 
more than $3,400. The smallest is in Breckenridge, Colorado, 
where the average reduction is just $1,400.
Local labor market conditions, demographics and cost of 
living all play roles in driving these differences across met-
1. Jonathan B. Forman, “Earned Income Tax Credit,” The Encyclopedia of Taxation 
and Tax Policy, 2nd edition, eds. Joseph Cordes, Robert Ebel and Jane Gravelle, Urban 
Institute Press, Washington D.C., 2005. 
2. This figure includes $61 billion of direct outlays and $3 billion in lost tax revenue.
 
TABLE 1: FEDERAL EITC SCHEDULE
Taxpaxer
Phase-in rate 
(%)
Income level, 
phase-in ends ($)
Max credit ($)
Income level, phase-
out begins ($)
Phase-out 
rate (%)
Income level, credit 
exhausted ($)
Single, no  
children
7.65 6,580 503 8,240 7.65 14,820 
Single, 1 child 34.00 9,880 3,359 18,110 15.98 39,131 
Single, 2  
children
40.00 13,870 5,548 18,110 21.06 44,454 
Single, 2+  
children
45.00     13,870 6,242 18,110 21.06 47,747 
Married, no 
children
7.65 6,580 503 13,760 7.65 20,340 
Married, 1 child 34.00 9,880 3,359 23,630 15.98 44,651 
Married, 2  
children
40.00 13,870 5,548 23,630 21.06 49,974 
Married, 2+ 
children
45.00 13,870 6,242 23,630 21.06 53,267 
Source: Internal Revenue Service and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
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ropolitan areas. Generally, poorer areas show higher claim 
rates and larger claims, especially in areas with larger 
 average  family size. Table 2 shows EITC claim rates and aver-
age claims for select large metropolitan areas. 
TABLE 2: EITC CLAIMS IN REPRESENTATIVE LARGE METROS
City Claim rate (%) Avg savings ($)
Chicago 17.16  2,448 
Columbus, Ohio 15.29  2,136 
Denver 14.45  2,154 
Houston 21.68  2,612 
Indianapolis 18.97  2,374 
Los Angeles 21.00  2,319 
Memphis, Tenn. 30.08  2,861 
New York 18.84  2,312 
Orlando, Fla. 25.92  2,543 
Philadelphia 16.37  2,270 
Phoenix 19.66  2,487 
San Antonio 24.17  2,541 
San Francisco 11.51  1,933 
Washington 12.84  2,212 
United States 19.62  2,371 
Source: IRS SOI 2013 data. Authors’ calculations. Metro areas are defined 
by U.S. Census Bureau’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which com-
prise counties. Percent of tax filers and tax savings are values from 2013 
IRS ZIP Code files, aggregated to metropolitan areas using ArcGIS. 
The table demonstrates the heterogeneity in ETIC benefits; 
the EITC claim rate in Orlando, Florida, is nearly double that 
of Washington, while Memphis, Tennessee’s rate is nearly 
triple that of San Francisco. The tax savings from the EITC 
show less variation, as most metro areas are within a few 
hundred dollars of the national average, but the average 
claim in Memphis is 50 percent larger than in San Francisco. 
A general geographical trend is that higher claim rates and 
dollars claimed are found in the Southeast and Texas, while 
lower claim amounts and rates are found in the rest of the 
country, particularly the Northeast and San Francisco.
As seen in Table 3, smaller metropolitan areas display a much 
higher degree of variation in both claim rates and average 
tax savings than larger cities. The claim rate in Brownsville, 
Texas is nearly four times the claim rate in Stamford, Con-
necticut. Some modest-income small cities (like Peoria, 
Illinois) have few beneficiaries from the EITC, while oth-
ers (like Tupelo, Mississippi) have claim rates near 30 per-
cent. The tax-savings differences are wider in small cities as 
well, with the average claim differing by more than $1,000 
between Madison, Wisconsin and Brownsville, Texas.
To further examine the cause of EITC benefit differences 
across metropolitan areas, we use a multifactor model to 
describe differences between metro areas and determine 
how they relate to EITC claim-rate differences. The  model 
examines four basic factors: cost of living; labor-market con-
ditions (employment); poverty; and family demographics 
(household size). The full model is described in the appen-
dices. These factors were chosen because they represent 
both factors that make the EITC more generous (poverty, 
and household size), and less generous (cost of living and 
employment). The basic model shows that all four factors are 
strongly associated with EITC claim rates, in both a statisti-
cal and economic sense.
Higher poverty rates are associated with higher EITC claims 
in a metro area. Since the EITC is targeted to lower-income 
individuals, a greater percentage of low earners implies more 
EITC claims. The model shows that, while this association is 
particularly strong, the correlation is not one to one. For a 10 
percent increase in the poverty rate, EITC claims jump by 3.7 
percent in metropolitan areas. Family size also is positively 
related to EITC claims. The EITC is more generous for larger 
families, making it more likely to induce work among that 
group. In our sample, a 10 percent increase in the average 
family size relates to a 13 percent increase in the population 
that claims federal EITC benefits.
The relationship between local employment rates and 
EITC claims is not as straightforward. A recipient must be 
employed to claim the EITC, so one might expect a posi-
tive relationship between the two. On the other hand, a 
metro with high employment rates signals a robust labor 
market, likely to have more jobs that pay in excess of EITC 
TABLE 3: EITC CLAIMS IN REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS
City Claim rate (%) Avg savings ($)
Bellingham, Wash. 14.22  1,885 
Brownsville, Texas 43.88  3,072 
Chapel Hill, N.C. 17.82  2,325 
Dayton, Ohio 26.09  2,435 
Fairbanks, Alaska 13.40  2,112 
Flagstaff, Ariz. 19.79  2,118 
Hilton Head, S.C. 19.48  2,476 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 22.34  2,401 
Madison, Wis. 10.84  1,904 
Peoria, Ill. 16.65  2,347 
Pueblo, Colo. 24.23  2,336 
Stamford, Conn. 11.92  2,147 
Tupelo, Miss. 29.20  2,533 
Winston-Salem, N.C. 22.04  2,393 
United States 19.62  2,371 
Source: IRS SOI 2013 data. Authors’ calculations. Metro areas are defined 
by U.S. Census Bureau’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which 
comprise counties. Percent of tax filers and tax savings are values from 
2013 IRS ZIP Code files, aggregated to metropolitan areas using ArcGIS. 
Stamford, Conn. includes Bridgeport and Norwalk, Conn. Chapel Hill, N.C. 
includes Durham, N.C.  Brownsville, Texas includes Harlington, Texas.
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income limits. The latter factor dominates the data, as  higher 
 employment rates are associated with lower EITC claim 
rates. This relationship is quite strong at the metro area level, 
with a 10 percent increase in the employment rate associated 
with an 8.5 percent decline in EITC claims.
Finally, our model shows a strong negative relationship 
between an area’s cost of living and EITC claims. For a 10 
percent increase in the cost of living, EITC claims fall by 
7.5 percent. At first glance, this relationship may seem puz-
zling: if goods and services are more expensive, wouldn’t it 
behoove the less fortunate to claim the EITC?  Unfortunate-
ly, the EITC’s design as a one-size-fits-all national program 
severely alters its effectiveness across areas with different 
cost and compensation structures, a topic explained further 
in the next section.  
COST OF LIVING AND THE EITC
The cost to feed a family in Boston is 53 percent higher than 
it is in Jackson, Tennessee, but the federal EITC does not 
recognize that difference when determining the tax break 
applied to workers in each of those cities. The policy imposes 
a national maximum on the total applicable EITC, and for 
each income bracket that determines credit eligibility. This 
results in real differences in how much benefit the credit cre-
ates for poor families in differing local labor markets. 
A similar point can be made about any federal policy that 
imposes national limits on programs whose impacts vary 
greatly across different markets. The authors previously 
made this point about the minimum wage and its impact on 
employment loss across different states with different pre-
existing wage distributions in a 2014 paper for the Journal 
of Labor Research.3 The relevance of a national maximum 
on the EITC is magnified because it is targeted at those for 
whom a small difference in the credit may constitute a large 
share of income. Its importance also has grown as the EITC 
has become the primary anti-poverty tool deployed at the 
federal level.
Figure 1 highlights the vast differences in the cost of living 
across U.S. metropolitan areas.4  Not surprisingly, the most 
expensive are in the major cities of the Northeast and coast-
al California. There are pockets of higher-cost areas dotted 
throughout the country – including Miami; Portland, Ore-
gon; Seattle; and Minneapolis. But most of the country, and 
particularly the Southeast and Texas, are mostly composed 
of lower cost-of-living metro areas.
These cost-of-living differences transform the EITC from 
a uniform federal policy to one that has drastically differ-
ent real value to the working poor across the country. Real 
3. Andrew Hanson and Zackary Hawley, “The $10.10 Minimum Wage Proposal: An 
Evaluation across States,” Journal of Labor Research, 35(4), pp. 323–345, 2014. 
4. All cost-of-living data come from the Council for Community and Economic 
Research.  Appendix II describes how cost-of-living calculations are made across 
metropolitan areas.
FIGURE 1: COST OF LIVING BY LARGE METRO AREA
SOURCE: The Council for Community and Economic Research. Authors’ calculations.
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value  differences in the spending power generated by the 
flat national maximum credit imply that it is less effective 
at inducing the intended positive response to look for work. 
This response can be broken down into two pieces:
1. The maximum EITC at the federal level is set nation-
ally. This affects the credit’s real value in terms of 
what a recipient can purchase. The same nominal 
credit dollar will induce fewer people to seek work 
in high-cost cities and more people to seek work in 
low-cost cities.
2. EITC income limits also are set at the federal level. A 
worker in a high-cost city may be rendered ineligible 
for the EITC, despite having the same standard of liv-
ing (real wages, after adjusting for cost of living) as a 
similar worker in a low-cost city. 
Tables 4 and 5 show how the real value of the national maxi-
mum credit differs by local cost of living. Nationally, the max-
imum credit ranges between $503 (for single taxpayers) to 
$6,242 (for taxpayers with three dependent children). These 
dollar amounts are updated annually to reflect general price 
inflation, but they are not adjusted to reflect local differences 
in the buying power the maximum credit affords.
 
Consider that the $5,548 maximum federal credit for a fam-
ily with two children is worth only $2,529 in New York City, 
but $6,523 in Memphis, equivalent to 2.5 times the purchas-
ing power. While the difference between New York and 
Memphis might be extreme, there are a wide range of metro 
areas where the cost of living significantly erodes the val-
ue of the EITC relative to the median cost of living in the 
United States. EITC recipients in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco and Washington all lose more than a $1,000 in 
the real value of the maximum credit, a not inconsequential 
amount for the working poor in these areas. 
At the same time, the residents of some metros enjoy a boon, 
because the maximum credit is worth more in real purchas-
ing power. Several cities have more than an extra $500 in real 
purchasing terms, including Indianapolis, San Antonio and 
Columbus, Ohio. Geographically, the credit’s value is par-
ticularly eroded in the Northeast and along the West Coast.
TABLE 5: COL-ADJUSTED VALUE OF MAX CREDIT IN  
REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS ($)
City
Number of children
Zero One Two Three
Stamford, Conn.  351  2,342  3,868  4,352 
Fairbanks, Alaska  375  2,506  4,139  4,657 
Flagstaff, Ariz.  446  2,977  4,917  5,532 
Chapel Hill, N.C.  451  3,011  4,973  5,596 
Bellingham, Wash.  462  3,088  5,101  5,739 
Madison, Wis.  478  3,193  5,273  5,933 
Hilton Head, S.C.  470  3,140  5,186  5,835 
By Statute  503  3,359  5,548  6,242 
Peoria, Ill.  507  3,386  5,592  6,292 
Dayton, Ohio  546  3,644  6,019  6,771 
Brownsville, Texas  562  3,751  6,196  6,971 
Winston-Salem, N.C.  571  3,812  6,296  7,084 
Tupelo, Miss.  580  3,870  6,392  7,192 
Idaho Falls, Idaho  590  3,939  6,506  7,319 
Pueblo, Colo.  605  4,040  6,673  7,508 
 
SOURCE: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and 
TABLE 4: COL-ADJUSTED VALUE OF MAX CREDIT IN REPRESEN-
TATIVE LARGE METROS ($) 
City
Number of children
Zero One Two Three
New York* 229.32 1,531.41 2,529.39 2,845.80 
San Francisco 312.86 2,089.27 3,450.80 3,882.46 
Washington 360.77 2,409.23 3,979.28 4,477.05 
Los Angeles 387.39 2,586.98 4,272.87 4,807.36 
Philadelphia 416.29 2,779.94 4,591.58 5,165.94 
Chicago 438.14 2,925.86 4,832.59 5,437.10 
Denver 484.52 3,235.59 5,344.17 6,012.68 
By Statute  503.00 3,359.00   5,548.00 6,242.00 
Houston 509.22 3,400.51  5,616.56 6,319.13 
Orlando, Fla. 523.74 3,497.50 5,776.76 6,499.37 
Phoenix 526.16 3,513.63 5,803.41 6,529.35 
Indianapolis 548.95 3,665.83   6,054.79 6,812.19 
San Antonio 568.84 3,798.66 6,274.18 7,059.02 
Columbus 578.78 3,865.06 6,383.85 7,182.41 
Memphis, Tenn. 591.36  3,949.05 6,522.57 7,338.48 
SOURCE: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and 
Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price 
differences for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and 
miscellaneous goods and services. 
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan. Figures for Brooklyn 
are: $295, $1,968, $3,251 and $3,658. Figures for Queens are: $332, $2,219, 
$3,665 and $4,124.
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Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price 
differences for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and 
miscellaneous goods and services. 
As shown in Table 5, this is not merely a big-city phenom-
enon. While the real value of the maximum credit in smaller 
metros is not eroded as fully as in a place like New York City, 
there are many smaller areas where the EITC has a substan-
tially lower real value than what is set nominally by federal 
statute. For example, in Stamford, Connecticut, the real value 
of the maximum credit is only about 70 percent of what a 
recipient in a median cost-of-living city like Peoria, Illinois 
receives. On the other end, many smaller metros are substan-
tially less costly than larger metros, providing a boost in the 
real value of the maximum credit. In Idaho Falls, Idaho, and 
Pueblo, Colorado, the maximum credit has more than $1,000 
more purchasing power for a family with three children than 
the national limit.
Differences in the purchasing power of the maximum credit 
mean the EITC is less likely to induce the out-of-work to 
look for a job in high-cost cities, especially considering that 
many forms of assistance, such Section 8 housing vouchers, 
are cost-of-living adjusted. It also means the policy extends 
the least help to those potentially in the most need – the 
working poor who live in high-cost areas.
Compounding the problem is that the EITC also is based 
on national income limits. A single tax filer qualifies for the 
maximum credit with an annual income of $9,880. The credit 
begins to phase out at an income of $18,110. And it is com-
pletely exhausted at an income of $39,131, regardless of local 
incomes and prices in the city where the worker lives. As is 
obvious to anyone who has spent much time in Manhattan, a 
$40,000 annual salary doesn’t buy much in the city, while the 
same wage might be more than enough for a single person to 
get by in Tupelo, Mississippi. 
Combining national income limits with differing costs of liv-
ing effectively produces different real income limits for the 
EITC’s availability across metro areas. This generates differ-
ent labor-market incentives for similar workers in different 
metropolitan areas. Consider the income level at which the 
credit is completely exhausted – $39,131. That level of nomi-
nal income has much less real purchasing power in New York 
than it does nationally. Workers with that level of income in 
TABLE 6: COL-ADJUSTED EITC INCOME LIMITS IN REPRESENTATIVE LARGE METROS ($)
City
Single Married
Max credit eligible Phase out begins Credit exhausted Max credit eligible Phase out begins Credit exhausted
New York* 4,504 8,257 17,840 4,504 10,773 20,357 
San Francisco 6,145 11,264 24,339 6,145 14,698 27,772 
Washington 7,086 12,989 28,067 7,086 16,949 32,026 
Los Angeles 7,609 13,948 30,137 7,609 18,199 34,389 
Philadelphia 8,177 14,988 32,385 8,177 19,556 36,954 
Chicago 8,606 15,775 34,085 8,606 20,583 38,893 
Denver 9,517 17,445 37,693 9,517 22,762 43,011 
By Statute 9,880 18,110 39,131 9,880 23,630 44,651 
Houston 10,002 18,334 39,615 10,002 23,922 45,203 
Orlando, Fla. 10,287 18,857 40,744 10,287 24,604 46,492 
Phoenix 10,335 18,944 40,932 10,335 24,718 46,707 
Indianapolis 10,783 19,764 42,705 10,783 25,789 48,730 
San Antonio 11,173 20,480 44,253 11,173 26,723 50,495 
Columbus, Ohio 11,369 20,838 45,026 11,369 27,190 51,378 
Memphis, Tenn. 11,616 21,291 46,005 11,616 27,781 52,494 
SOURCE: Council for Community and Economic Research data. Parameters reflect tax filer with one dependent child. Differences for single tax filers and 
those with three or more children would be magnified across metros. Differences for tax filers with two children would be similar to those presented above.
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan
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New York are actually poor, but they get no federal EITC. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the same annual earn-
ings in Columbus, Ohio, translate into $45,000 of purchasing 
power, providing a much higher standard of living. Table 6 
demonstrates the relative income differences that the EITC 
income limits actually produce when considering local cost 
of living in several large metropolitan areas. While this is 
only a small problem in cities near the median, the EITC 
income limits severely dampen the credit’s usefulness in sev-
eral metros with a large population living in poverty, like Los 
Angeles and Washington.
As in the case of the credit maximum, national income limits 
are not just a problem for big cities. Table 7 shows several 
smaller towns where the national income limit is substan-
tially less in real terms. The drop-off is nearly $10,000 in 
Fairbanks, Alaska, and almost $5,000 in Flagstaff, Arizona. 
At the same time, low-cost smaller towns get an even bigger 
boost from the national income limit. For example, $39,131 
of income – set by statute as the level at which the credit is 
completely exhausted for a single filer – is equivalent to more 
than $47,000 of purchasing power in Pueblo, Colorado, or 
more than double the purchasing power enjoyed by a worker 
in Stamford, Connecticut.
Tables 6 and 7 show the real income difference induced by the 
phase out, which is set nationally at $18,110. Because EITC 
income limits are not adjusted for cost of living, workers are 
moved into the phase-out range of the credit at significantly 
different levels of real income. Workers with equivalent skill 
sets, and probably very similar lifestyles, face enormously 
different marginal tax rates as the credit is pulled back. 
When a worker’s income moves into the phase-out range, 
he or she starts to incur the tax of paying back the EITC. This 
payback happens at especially low levels of effective income 
in high-cost areas, like New York and San Francisco. This 
amounts to as much as a 21-percentage-point higher tax rate 
for a similar worker in different cities.
From a worker’s perspective, hitting the phase-out region 
of the credit can greatly decrease the EITC’s incentive to 
work. As the Congressional Budget Office points out in a 2012 
study, the phase out of the EITC – along with the loss, as 
income increases, of other means-tested anti-poverty pro-
grams – creates marginal tax rates in excess of 90 percent for 
some workers who earn less than $20,000 annually.5
Economist Casey Mulligan makes the connection that these 
high marginal tax rates destroys the incentive to work, 
especially for workers with weak attachments to the labor 
5. Congressional Budget Office, “Illustrative Examples of Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
Faced by Married and Single Taxpayers: Supplemental Material for Effective Marginal 
Tax Rates for Low- and Moderate-Income Workers,” November 2012. https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43722-Supplemental_
Material-MarginalTaxRates.pdf
TABLE 7: COL-ADJUSTED EITC INCOME LIMITS IN REPRESENTATIVE SMALL METROS ($)
City
Single Married
Max credit 
eligible
Phase out 
begins
Credit 
exhausted
Max credit 
eligible
Phase out 
begins
Credit 
exhausted
Stamford, Conn. 6,888 12,625 27,280 6,888 16,473 31,128 
Fairbanks, Alaska 7,371 13,511 29,193 7,371 17,629 33,312 
Flagstaff, Ariz. 8,757 16,051 34,682 8,757 20,943 39,574 
Chapel Hill, N.C. 8,857 16,235 35,079 8,857 21,183 40,027 
Bellingham, Wash. 9,084 16,651 35,979 9,084 21,727 41,055 
Madison, Wis. 9,391 17,214 37,194 9,391 22,461 42,441 
Hilton Head, S.C. 9,236 16,929 36,580 9,236 22,090 41,740 
By Statute 9,880 18,110 39,131 9,880 23,630 44,651 
Peoria, Ill. 9,959 18,255 39,444 9,959 23,819 45,008 
Dayton, Ohio 10,718 19,646 42,450 10,718 25,634 48,438 
Brownsville, Texas 11,034 20,225 43,700 11,034 26,389 49,865 
Winston-Salem, N.C. 11,212 20,552 44,408 11,212 26,817 50,673 
Tupelo, Miss. 11,384 20,866 45,087 11,384 27,226 51,447 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 11,585 21,236 45,885 11,585 27,708 52,358 
Pueblo, Colo. 11,884 21,784 47,069 11,884 28,423 53,708 
SOURCE: Council for Community and Economic Research data. Parameters reflect tax filer with one dependent child. Differences for single tax filers and 
those with three or more children would be magnified across metros. Differences for tax filers with two children would be similar to those presented above.
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force.6 Due to local differences in labor-market conditions, 
the EITC phase out’s destruction of work incentives does 
not affect cities uniformly. Local effects will depend on the 
interaction between the national income limit and a given 
city’s wage distribution.
To illustrate, take the case of someone with one child work-
ing as a dishwasher in different cities. Although this person 
is living in poverty by any reasonable definition, as a result 
of the EITC’s national income limits, how they are treated 
by the tax code will differ depending on their nominal wage, 
which has a different value in different local markets. The 
dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas who works a standard 
2,000-hour year will never hit the EITC phase out. For that 
worker, the program maintains its normal incentives to work. 
But the same dishwasher in San Francisco will have to start 
repaying the EITC after working just 1,700 hours in a year. 
That worker’s $10.73 average hourly wage becomes just $8.47 
in take-home pay. That’s because the San Francisco worker 
will have to repay the EITC, even though he or she is no less 
6. Casey Mulligan, The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Con-
tracted the Economy, Oxford University Press, 2012.
poor, in real terms, than his or her Brownsville counterpart.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate how the EITC phase-out effec-
tively begins at different levels of work hours for equivalent 
workers across U.S. cities. The smaller the number of hours 
before the phase-out begins, the more disincentive to work 
the phase-out tax rate creates. For the modest wages earned 
by a customer-service representative, he or she will hit the 
phase-out portion of the EITC in all locations. However, this 
phase-out begins at less than half of a standard work year in 
many high-cost areas. In low-cost areas, it is as much as 50 
percent higher.
This is the central problem of the mismatch between the 
national income limit and local labor-market conditions – 
it pushes equivalent workers with similar living standards 
toward the phase-out region of the EITC at vastly different 
rates. This problem is exacerbated by differences in local 
labor-market regulations, most notably the minimum wage. 
Contrast a city that decides to raise its local hourly mini-
mum wage to $15 with one that uses the federal minimum 
of $7.25. Workers who are able to maintain employment in 
the higher minimum-wage city will nearly all be moved off 
the EITC schedule, mitigating any gains they may have had 
FIGURE 2: HOURS WORKED BEFORE EITC PHASE-OUT ACROSS LARGE METRO AREAS
SOURCE: IRS SOI 2013 data, BLS May 2014 summary file and authors’ calculations. Hours worked calculated based 
on average hourly wage for dishwasher workers in metro area. 
R STREET POLICY STUDY: 2016  LOCAL LABOR MARKETS AND THE FEDERAL EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT  9
from the wage increase. Those gains may be further eroded 
by the fact that high minimum-wage cities also tend to be 
high-cost areas and that employers tend to raise prices when 
faced with minimum-wage increases. 
CONCLUSION: MAKING THE EITC  
MORE IMPACTFUL
The benefits of the EITC are well-established. It improves 
labor-market opportunities for the working poor, boots 
income and is regarded widely as the most effective anti-pov-
erty tool in the federal toolkit. The benefits reach beyond the 
labor market, with research showing the credit is responsible 
for a wide range of life improvements, such as better health, 
improved elementary-school performance and even higher 
levels of college attendance. Unfortunately, these gains likely 
are confined to areas where national EITC parameters are 
generous relative to local wages and costs of living. They may 
be nonexistent in high-cost metropolitan areas, where many 
of the nation’s poor reside. 
A simple and effective fix to expand the EITC’s benefits 
would be to adjust it for local labor-market and cost-of-liv-
ing conditions. Adjusting the national maximum allowable 
credit and national income limits would mean that workers 
in similar living situations would be treated equitably – a 
dishwasher in Brownsville, Texas would get the same rela-
tive benefits from the EITC as a dishwasher in San Francisco. 
Adjusting the EITC for local conditions also may help to slow 
the migration of working poor families out of expensive cit-
ies, allowing them to maintain workplace and family net-
works without sacrificing quality of life.
To equalize EITC’s labor-market gains across cities and 
expand its positive incentive to work, the credit also could 
be made more generous overall. We simulate a model (details 
contained in Appendix III) that estimates how much the 
maximum EITC would need to be increased across metro 
areas to induce a 6-percentage-point increase in the labor-
force participation of local workers. This simulation consid-
ers both the cost-of-living adjustment and the general rise 
in benefits. Results for the metro areas covered by our study 
are displayed in Table 8. While the increase in the credit that 
would be needed to boost labor-force participation is sub-
FIGURE 3: HOURS WORKED BEFORE EITC PHASE-OUT ACROSS SMALL METRO AREAS
SOURCE: IRS SOI 2013 data, BLS May 2014 summary file and authors’ calculations. Hours worked calculated based on average 
hourly wage for dishwasher workers in metro area. Hilton Head metro uses average wage from the Low Country Non Metro 
area that covers Beaufort County, which contains Hilton Head. Tupelo metro uses average wage from the Northeast MS Non 
Metro area that covers Lee County, which contains Tupelo.
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stantial in high-cost areas and for childless workers, who 
currently receive only a small credit, it is much more modest 
in low-cost areas and for workers with more children, who 
already receive a fairly substantial credit.
TABLE 8: INCREASE IN MAX EITC NEEDED TO RAISE LABOR-
FORCE PARTICIPATION 6 PERCENTAGE POINTS ($)
City
Number of children
Zero One Two Three
New York* 6,387    6,546  6,339 6,201 
San Francisco 4,548    4,798  4,647 4,546 
Stamford, Conn. 4,003    4,281  4,146 4,056 
Washington 3,877    4,161  4,029 3,942 
Fairbanks, Alaska 3,708    4,000  3,874 3,790 
Los Angeles 3,576    3,875  3,753 3,671 
Philadelphia 3,293    3,606  3,492 3,416 
Chicago 3,103    3,426  3,318 3,246 
Flagstaff, Ariz. 3,041    3,367  3,261 3,190 
Chapel Hill, N.C. 3,001    3,329  3,224 3,154 
Bellingham, Wash. 2,914    3,246  3,143 3,075 
Hilton Head, S.C. 2,857    3,192  3,092 3,024 
Madison, Wis. 2,802    3,140  3,041 2,974 
Denver, Colo. 2,758    3,098  3,000 2,935 
Peoria, Ill. 2,613    2,961  2,867 2,805 
Houston, Texas 2,600    2,948  2,855 2,793 
Orlando, Fla. 2,514    2,866  2,776 2,715 
Phoenix, Ariz. 2,500    2,853  2,763 2,703 
Dayton, Ohio 2,393    2,751  2,664 2,606 
Indianapolis 2,375    2,735  2,648 2,591 
Brownsville, Texas 2,310    2,672  2,588 2,532 
San Antonio 2,275    2,639  2,556 2,500 
Winston-Salem, N.C. 2,265    2,630  2,547 2,491 
Columbus, Ohio 2,227    2,594  2,512 2,457 
Tupelo, Miss. 2,223    2,590  2,508 2,454 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 2,176    2,545  2,465 2,411 
Memphis, Tenn. 2,169    2,538  2,458 2,405 
Pueblo, Colo. 2,109    2,481  2,403 2,350 
 
Source: Data on cost of living come from the Council for Community and 
Economic Research. Cost-of-living adjustments include the relative price 
difference for groceries, transportation, housing, utilities, health care and 
miscellaneous goods and services.  
* New York estimate is for cost of living in Manhattan.
This exercise also shows that, while expanding the EITC 
would be expensive, targeting funding based on cost of liv-
ing can provide a more even distribution of the policy’s labor-
market gains. This simulation shows that, from a federal 
standpoint, $8,056 in Tupelo, Mississippi will buy you the 
same labor-market gains as $11,887 in New York. Offering the 
standard national rate prompts basically no response in New 
York, while inducing a large change in Tupelo. From a practi-
cal standpoint, the Internal Revenue Service already collects 
all of the necessary data to determine the proper cost-of-
living adjustment needed to equalize EITC payments. 
Beyond making geographic adjustments to the EITC, other 
changes could be made to the tax break to increase its use-
fulness as a labor-market intervention. First and foremost, 
the phase-out schedule could be reconfigured to use a lower 
rate, a change that would remove the current disincentive for 
additional work. Second, payroll data could be used to dis-
pense EITC payments more regularly, as workers currently 
receive the benefit in a lump sum once per year. This change 
could heighten the labor-market response and reduce unnec-
essary and expensive borrowing by recipients. Lastly, policy-
makers should consider how the EITC interacts with both 
federal and state minimum-wage policies. Minimum wages 
effectively make the EITC less effective as a means to expand 
job opportunities for the less fortunate. In the extreme, they 
could push some EITC recipients into the phase-out region 
or completely off the credit, curbing any perceived gains.   
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APPENDIX I: CROSS-SECTION REGRESSION 
MODEL OF EITC CLAIM RATES
This model examines differences in EITC claim rates (the 
dependent variable) using differences in local cost of living, 
poverty, employment and demographics (the independent 
variables). The basic model uses cross-section regression 
analysis to determine what factors are related to EITC claim 
differences. Cross-section regression allows for multiple fac-
tors to be examined simultaneously, but does not allow for 
a clear causal relationship between these factors and EITC 
claim rates to be determined. The model should be viewed as 
determining if the set of factors we examine share a relation-
ship with EITC claim rates, holding other factors constant.
The basic model is:
Ln (EITC Claim Rate) = α + β1 (Ln(CLI)) + β2 (Ln(Pov)) 
+ β3 (Ln(Emp)) + β4 (Ln(F.Size)) + ε
Where CLI is the cost-of-living value for each metro, mea-
sured in an index with a median of 100; Pov is the percentage 
of residents living in poverty; Emp is the employment rate; 
and F.Size is the average number of persons per household. 
All variables are transformed using natural logs, so the inter-
pretation of each output coefficient (β) is an elasticity. Each 
β estimate shows what percentage EITC claim rate change 
is related to a given percentage change in the corresponding 
variable. For example, a β3 value of 0.5 would be interpreted 
as a 10 percent rise in employment being related to a 5 per-
cent rise in the EITC claim rate. 
We estimate the model using data on a cross section of 251 
metropolitan areas where we have data on all four factors. 
All data are from the year 2013. Cost-of-living data are taken 
from the Council for Community and Economic Research 
database, as described in Appendix II. EITC claim rate data 
come from the IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code-level files 
and are aggregated to the metropolitan area using ArcGIS 
software. Poverty, employment and family-size data come 
from U.C. Census estimates, using survey data from the 
American Community Survey.
The results of the model are:
TABLE 9: RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTION REGRESSION MODEL OF 
EITC CLAIM RATES
lneitc Estimate Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Int.]
Ln (CLI) β1 -0.75139 0.090124 -8.34 0.00 -0.92891 -0.57388
Ln (Pov) β2 0.370661 0.042414 8.74 0.00 0.287121 0.454201
Ln (Emp) β3 -0.85731 0.103643 -8.27 0.00 -1.06145 -0.65317
Ln (F. Size) β4 1.303222 0.113997 11.43 0.00 1.078687 1.527757
α 7.628794 0.674328 11.31 0.00 6.300601 8.956987
APPENDIX II: COST-OF-LIVING CALCULATION
Cost-of-living data for metropolitan areas come from the 
Council for Community and Economic Research. We use 
their 100 percent composite index from the annual aggrega-
tion for the year 2013. The data are aggregated from local-
area chambers of commerce, based on voluntary participa-
tion. The composite index uses the following weights for 
cost-of-living components (note that rounding to the sec-
ond decimal results in a summed total value of 100.01, rather 
than 100):
• Grocery items: 13.48 percent
• Housing: 26.05 percent
• Utilities: 9.95 percent
• Transportation: 12.63 percent
• Health care: 4.89 percent
• Miscellaneous goods and services: 33.01 percent
Housing costs are based on rents, home prices and mortgage-
interest rates. Health-care costs are based on doctor, den-
tist, optometrist and some drug prices. Utilities costs include 
energy costs and phone costs. Transportation costs include 
gasoline and some auto repair. Grocery items and miscel-
laneous goods contain a wide range of items, from bread 
to tennis balls. Within each category, items are assigned a 
weight based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer 
Expenditure Survey. 
The composite index is calculated to assign a value of 100 to 
the median cost-of-living area, with higher scores for rela-
tively higher cost-of-living areas and lower scores for lower 
cost-of-living areas. The magnitude of the difference in cost 
of living is consistent with the difference between 100 and 
the metro area score, regardless whether one moves up or 
down the scale. 
APPENDIX III: EITC-INDUCED LABOR-MARKET 
CHANGES
Estimates from a 1996 paper by Nada Eissa and Jeffrey 
Liebman show that a $1,186 increase in the maximum EITC 
results in a 2.8-percentage-point increase in labor-force 
participation.7 More recently, Katie Fitzpatrick and Jeffrey 
Thompson showed that, for every $1,000 increase in the local 
cost of living, the labor-force participation increase from the 
EITC falls by 1 percentage point.8 
7. Nada Eissa and Jeffrey Liebman, “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income 
Tax Credit,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2): 605–637, 1996.
8. Katie Fitzpatrick and Jeffrey Thompson, “The Interaction of metropolitan cost-
of-living and the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit: One Size Fits All?” National Tax 
Journal, 63(3): 419–446, 2010.
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We use these estimates and the cost-of-living data to create 
an estimate of the relative adjustment that would be needed 
for the current EITC to induce a 6-percentage-point increase 
in labor-force participation. We chose 6 percentage points as 
our outcome because current labor-force participation rates 
among women between 25 and 54 are about 74 percent, and 
most EITC recipients are single mothers. A change of 6 per-
centage points would bring the rate in line with the popula-
tion rate for that age range (80 percent). Our calculation also 
considers that the EITC becomes marginally less effective 
at inducing labor-force participation as earnings increase, 
so that a larger credit is needed to move the labor-force-
participation rate 1 percentage point from a larger base. Our 
equation for the size EITC needed for a 6-percentage-point 
change in labor-force participation is:
New Max Credit = Current Max + Ci  *  
(I+P)
 
Where I, P, Ci and Eg come from the following equations:
I =  LFP Increase 2.8*1,186
P = 100 * LFP Increase
Ci =  
Index
  
Eg=              
1
 
Where I is the unadjusted-dollar increase in maximum EITC 
credit that would increase the labor-force-participation 
rate by 6 percentage points; P is the penalty added to this 
amount, which increases as larger labor-force inducements 
are desired; and Ci adjusts the amount appropriately for local 
cost of living. Finally, Eg adjusts for the relative difference in 
labor-supply elasticities between single workers and those 
with increasing numbers of dependent children. 
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